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Kyiv’s gas strategy: 
closer cooperation with Gazprom or a genuine diversification
Arkadiusz Sarna
In recent months Kyiv has been intensifying its efforts to diversify Ukraine’s gas supply ro-
utes with a view to reducing the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. One of the 
steps which Kyiv has taken has been to make the unprecedented decision to start importing 
gas from its Western neighbours. In November 2012, Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz began 
importing gas through Poland under a two-month contract with RWE (the imports continu-
ed into 2013 under a separate deal), while in the spring of 2013 Ukraine started importing 
gas from Hungary. Kyiv is also currently looking into the possibility of purchasing gas from 
Slovakia. Furthermore, since 2010 the Ukrainian government has been working on the con-
struction of an LNG terminal near Odesa. The authorities have declared that this will allow 
Ukraine to import up to 5 billion m3 of LNG a year by 2015. The government has also ta-
ken measures to increase domestic production, including from non-traditional sources, and 
it plans to replace gas-based with coal-based technologies in local power stations. Finally, 
in January 2013, the government signed a 50-year production sharing agreement with Shell. 
This paves the way for the development of Ukraine’s shale gas deposits.
Most of these initiatives are part of the official 
national energy strategy, which aims to increase 
domestic production and significantly reduce 
Ukraine’s dependence on gas imports by 20301. 
However, Kyiv’s current gas offensive stems 
mainly from the country’s failed efforts to re-
vise the unfavourable gas contract signed by 
Yulia Tymoshenko’s government in 2009. Due to 
Ukraine’s disproportionately heavy reliance on 
natural gas and, consequently, the over-depen-
dence of the country’s economy on the increas-
ingly unaffordable gas imports, the current 
government sees a revision of the ‘Tymoshen-
ko contract’ as one of its main objectives. How 
1 Under Ukraine’s Energy Strategy to 2030, adopted in 
2006 and now partly obsolete, the share of imported gas 
in the annual consumption is to drop to 19% by 2030. 
The amendments to the Energy Strategy, passed on 
7 June 2012, put the figure at under 11%.
Ukraine deals with the current economic reces-
sion and whether President Yanukovych will be 
re-elected in 2015 are believed to be dependent 
on whether this goal is achieved. Moscow, how-
ever, has set tough conditions for any changes 
to the current contract: in exchange for revising 
the terms of the deal, Russia wants complete 
control over Ukraine’s gas pipelines and/or for 
Ukraine to take an active role in the re-integra-
tion process of the post-Soviet states. As a result, 
Ukraine’s diversification projects, coupled with 
a significant reduction in gas imports, have had 
a negative effect on Gazprom’s performance, 
and have increased Kyiv’s bargaining power in 
its negotiations with Moscow. This however 
also means that if Moscow were to agree to 
a revision of the gas deal, Ukraine may need to 
abandon its current gas diversification projects, 
and possibly even its entire energy policy.
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The importance of gas for Ukraine’s 
economy
Natural gas is Ukraine’s main energy source, ac-
counting for about 40 per cent of the country’s 
primary energy supply. Ukraine has significant 
(traditional) gas reserves, estimated at 5.4 bil-
lion m3 (including 1.1 billion m3 of documented 
reserves)2. Domestic production, after peaking 
40 years ago (at 68.1 billion m3 in 1975) has 
been gradually falling and has stabilised in re-
cent years at around 20 billion m3. Consump-
tion levels have fallen from 118 billion m3 in 
1991 to less than 55 billion m3 in 2012 (see Ap-
pendix, Figure 1). Nonetheless, Ukraine remains 
a major gas consumer, ranking thirteenth in the 
world and fifth in Europe3.
Heavy industry is the largest consumer of nat-
ural gas in Ukraine (accounting for 40% of do-
mestic consumption) followed by households 
(over 30%). About 20% of gas is used by com-
munal heating systems supplying both govern-
ment buildings and residential properties, and 
it is estimated that as much as 9% of gas is 
wasted, for example through heat loss during 
transmission4. Gas also plays an important so-
cial function in Ukraine: providing cheap fuel 
to the general public is seen by the govern-
ment as a way to ensure relative social stabil-
2 Ukraine 2012. Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries, 
p.82. The data refer to conventional gas. According to 
preliminary assessments, Ukraine also has large uncon-
ventional gas resources: from porous sandstone (2-8 
billion m3), shale gas (5-8 billion m3), coalbed meth-
ane (12-25 billion m3). See also Mykhailo Honchar, First 
steps into the unknown. The prospects of unconven-
tional gas extraction in Ukraine, OSW Commentary, 
No. 106, 27/04/2013; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2013-04-27/first-steps-un-
known-prospects-unconventional-gas-extraction-ukr 
3 After Russia, the UK, Italy and Germany (2011); until 
1994, Ukraine was the world’s third largest gas consum-
er (after Russia and the US). See: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (http://www.eia.gov).
4 Source: Ukraine’s Energy Strategy for the period until 
2030 (the Government’s amendments to the strategy of 
2012), pp. 63-64; mpe.kmu.gov.ua/fuel/doccatalog/doc-
ument?iId=222032
ity in the country. Consequently, all gas, with 
the exception of that purchased by industry, is 
subsidised by the state. 90% of gas produced 
domestically is controlled by the state and is 
sold to individual and government consumers 
at fixed prices. This is reflected in the poor fi-
nancial performance of the state-owned gas 
producer Naftogaz. The company supplies gas 
to local consumers at a loss5 and has for years 
depended on state subsidies to stay afloat. At 
the end of 2012 Naftogaz and its subsidiaries 
owed $7.7 billion to local banks - an enormous 
sum by Ukrainian standards6.
In the past two decades, gas imports from Rus-
sia and the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia 
made up over 70% of Ukraine’s demand for 
gas. Despite a drop in import volumes from 53 
to 33 billion m3 between 2008 and 2012 (see 
Figure 2), a rapid increase in the price of gas 
has caused a huge upsurge in the annual cost 
of gas imports: from less than $4 billion in 2005 
to $14 billion in 2011-2012. Gas is Ukraine’s big-
gest import at present and is the main cause of 
the country’s structural trade deficit.
5 The price of gas for households consuming up to 2,500 m3 
a year (which accounts for the majority of end users) is 
equivalent to $91-$100 per 1,000 m3 (depending on the 
presence of gas meters), i.e. less than 25% of the cost of 
gas imported by Naftogaz from Russia.
6 http: //www.epravda.com.ua /publicat ions /2013/ 
01/14/356088/. In the first quarter of 2013, the debt 
increased by about $1 billion, although it is not clear 
whether Naftogaz paid off some of its previous debt 
during this period. In 2012, Naftogaz reported a net 
loss equivalent to $1.3 billion; in the first quarter of 
this year losses increased by 87% on the same period 
last year, reaching $ 970 million. http://www.unian.net/
news/570913-naftogaz-v-i-kvartale-uvelichil-chistyiy-
ubyitok-pochti-v-2-raza.html 
Despite a drop in gas consumption from 118 
billion m3 in 1991 to 55 billion m3 in 2012, 
Ukraine remains a major gas consumer: 
ranking 13th in the world and 5th in Europe.
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Ukraine remains the main transit route for Rus-
sian gas sold to Europe, which earns Kyiv over 
$3 billion a year in transit fees ($2.97 billion in 
20127), making it the country’s most lucrative 
export service recently. However, following 
Russia’s launch of the Nord Stream pipeline, 
which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes 
have been steadily decreasing. In 2004 more 
than 120 billion m3 of Russian gas was trans-
ported through Ukraine; this figure dropped to 
just 84 billion m3 in 20128.
Viktor Yanukovych’s ambiguous 
attempts at reform 
Despite official declarations to reform the 
Ukrainian gas sector and to diversify the coun-
try’s supply routes, consecutive governments 
have done little to implement real change. For 
years Kyiv’s policies have tended to be rather 
reactive, focusing on minimising the negative 
effects of the changing conditions of the supply 
of gas from Russia and Central Asia. The poli-
cies have tried to take advantage of Russia’s de-
pendence on Ukraine as a transit country and 
have blocked Moscow’s attempts to seize con-
trol of Ukraine’s gas pipelines9 and sought sup-
port from the West in gas disputes with Russia. 
Following Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, 
7 http://economics.unian.net/rus/news/168069-naftogaz-v-
1-m-kvartale-sokratil-dohod-ot-tranzita-gaza-na-18.html
8 http://www.unian.net/news/556667-ukraina-sokrati-
la-tranzit-rossiyskogo-gaza-v-es.html
9 In 2007, amendments to the bill on pipeline transport 
prohibited any changes of ownership in state-owned 
companies in the sector.
Russia began to steadily raise the price of gas 
supplied to Ukraine, with a view to eventually 
bringing it in line with the rates paid by other 
European states (until 2005 Kyiv was charged as 
little as $50 per 1,000 m3; since then the price 
has risen steeply to reach $426 per 1,000 m3 in 
2012 - see Figure 3). Over the course of a series 
of ‘gas wars’, Moscow has introduced increas-
ingly harsh terms and conditions for any new 
deals with Kyiv. The last ‘gas war’ ended on 
19 January 2009 with the signing of a gas 
supply contract which is to remain in force 
until the end of 2019. The new pricing formu-
la agreed in the deal is based on the market 
price of petroleum products and sets a very 
high base rate ($450 per 1,000 m3 of gas). 
It also sets the minimum annual purchase 
at 52 billion m3, introduces a ‘take or pay’ clause 
on 80% of that amount10 and bans Kyiv from ex-
porting any of the gas it purchases from Russia. 
Moscow’s decision to temporarily suspend gas 
supplies to several European countries during 
the most recent gas conflict drew international 
attention to the issue and prompted the EU to 
offer Kyiv help in modernising the country’s gas 
network, with the proviso that Ukraine reforms 
its gas sector. The condition was partly met 
by the new administration led by Viktor Yanu-
kovych, who won the presidential election held 
in February 2010.
In July 2010, Ukraine passed an energy bill 
which brings the local gas market closer in line 
with EU standards, including the introduction 
of a clear separation of legal entities involved 
in the extraction, transportation and the sale of 
gas. This was followed by Ukraine’s accession 
to the Energy Community in 2011. As a result, 
10 In 2009, import volumes were set at 40 billion m3. The 
‘take or pay’ clause covered 80% of the annual ship-
ment volume, i.e. 41.6 billion m3 (52 billion m3 minus 
20%). The contract allows for adjustments of +/- 20% 
of the contracted amount, thus reducing Ukraine’s min-
imum obligatory imports to 33.3 billion m3 [80% x (52 
billion m3 - 20%)] - as long as the reduction is agreed by 
both parties no later than six months before the start 
of a calendar year. See: http://www.pravda.com.ua/arti-
cles/2009/01/22/3686613/
Ukraine’s past governments failed to re-
form the country’s gas sector. The current 
attempts to address the issue are moti-
vated by Ukraine’s poor economic perfor-
mance. 
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Ukraine is expected to implement a number of 
EU directives concerning the operation of the 
country’s gas and electricity sectors, leading to 
a greater liberalisation and a gradual integra-
tion between the Ukrainian and the European 
energy markets. It should be noted howev-
er that Ukraine has undertaken these reforms 
mainly out of necessity due to the country’s 
poor economic performance and the need for 
foreign aid. An IMF loan, for example, was of-
fered on the condition that Ukraine agree to 
a gradual rise in gas tariffs for individual con-
sumers and for local power plants to provide 
residential heating and hot water (for 50% at 
the first stage). However, when the country’s 
financial situation stabilised, Kyiv began to put 
off further price hikes it had agreed on with the 
IMF and in 2011 the remaining loan disburse-
ments were frozen. As the country approached 
the 2012 parliamentary elections, the economy 
slowed down, support levels for the ruling Par-
ty of Regions dropped, and the reformist zeal 
began to decline. This was reflected in the slow 
pace of reform11 and the increasingly unclear 
direction of Kyiv’s policies. The privatisation of 
local gas distribution companies and the par-
tial liberalisation of gas imports mainly bene-
fited the companies owned by Dmytro Firtash, 
a controversial businessman with close links to 
the president.
Kyiv continues to see its cooperation with the 
West as a way of improving its bargaining posi-
tion in its relations with Russia. This is because 
since the beginning of Yanukovych’s term of of-
fice, the main objective of the new government 
and of the oligarchs linked to the cabinet (who 
also control the country’s largest industrial gas 
consumers) has been to secure a revision of the 
2009 contract. The Kharkiv Agreement signed 
in April 2010 has put a cap on the scale of the 
11 The government waited until June 2012 to establish 
UkrTransGaz (responsible for the transportation of gas) 
and Ukrgazvydobuvannya (major domestic producer of 
natural gas) as separate legal entities. 
price hikes12 but the main unfavourable terms 
of the 2009 gas contract (the pricing formu-
la calculated from a very high base price and 
the ‘take or pay’ clause) remain in place. Kyiv’s 
repeated attempts to amend the terms of the 
deal have so far failed to produce any tangible 
results. In fact, Russia’s position on the matter 
consolidated further when the EU and Ukraine 
reached the final stages in their negotiations on 
an Association Agreement in 2011. The symp-
toms of a weakening economy and the rapidly 
rising cost of Russian gas have prompted Kyiv 
to change its tactics. In January 2012, President 
Yanukovych set his government a course of ac-
tion based around three key steps designed to 
weaken Ukraine’s gas dependence on Moscow: 
first, domestic gas production should increase; 
second, there should be a shift from gas-based 
to coal-based technologies in the country’s 
power plants; and third, gas imports should be 
diversified.
Projects aimed at increasing domestic 
production
Last year, Kyiv intensified its cooperation with 
Western companies in the exploration of 
Ukraine’s prospective gas deposits, including 
deposits of non-traditional gas. In the spring 
of 2012 the government chose the oil company 
Shell to be an investor and the state’s partner in 
developing the Yuzivska field (eastern Ukraine). 
12 In exchange for agreeing to extend the lease for the 
Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, Russia offered Ukraine a dis-
count of up to $100 per 1,000m3 of gas.
In 2012 Kyiv intensified its cooperation 
with Western energy companies interest-
ed in the exploration and development of 
local gas deposits, including non-tradi-
tional deposits.
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Chevron was successful in a similar bid for the 
development of the Olesska deposits (west-
ern Ukraine), while in the summer of last year 
a consortium dominated by ExxonMobil and 
Shell was awarded a contract for the Skifska 
deposits in the Black Sea. On 24 January 2013, 
the Ukrainian government and Shell signed 
a 50-year production sharing agreement for the 
Yuzivska field. According to some commenta-
tors, the Ukrainian partners in the above-men-
tioned projects - Nadra Yuzivska and Nadra 
Oleska, both of which were established by the 
state-owned Nadra Ukrayny (90% stake) and 
a small, specialised private company SPK-Geo-
Servis (10% stake) - are likely to be influenced 
by individuals closely linked to the president13. 
Given the nature of the local business environ-
ment, such influence could increase the proj-
ect’s chances of success. Nonetheless, these 
initiatives will not see a positive outcome im-
mediately: if geological tests confirm the pres-
ence of the deposits, production on an indus-
trial scale would not start for another 5-6 years. 
According to the redrafted Energy Strategy, by 
2030 about half of Ukraine’s production is to 
come from non-traditional gas deposits (includ-
ing 6-11 billion m3 of shale gas a year)14.
Last year, state-owned Chornomornaftogaz 
(a Naftogaz subsidiary) intensified its efforts 
to raise gas production levels on the Black Sea 
shelf between 2011-2015 from 1 to 3 billion m3 
(in 2012 local production reached 1.2 billion m3 
13 See http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2012/08/ 
7/331514/ and Mykhailo Honchar, First steps into the un-
known... op.cit.
14 Mykhailo Honchar, First steps into the unknown... op.cit.
and is predicted to rise to 1.65 billion m3 in 
2013). These efforts have also led to operations 
being commenced at the Odesa offshore field 
and, upon completion of an 83 kilometre long 
underwater pipeline, locally produced gas will 
be pumped into the national gas network.
A planned conversion from gas to coal-
-based technologies 
On 25 December 2012, Naftogaz and the Chi-
na Development Bank signed a $3.7 billion 
loan agreement. Under the deal, Kyiv will use 
the money to finance Ukraine’s gradual switch 
from gas-based to coal gasification technol-
ogies developed by China. The deal followed 
an agreement being signed on 13 July 2012 
for cooperation on the implementation of the 
project between Ukraine’s Ministry of the Ener-
gy and Coal Industry and the CDB. The agree-
ment was also preceded by an amendment to 
Ukraine’s state budget, passed on 30 July 2012, 
which increased the maximum size of state 
guarantees for the proposed loan by UAH 29.5 
billion (approx. $3.7 billion). The funds are to 
be made available for a three-year period. The 
government’s programme and the Chinese loan 
have, however, led to a number of questions 
being raised. Under the scheme, Ukraine is to 
start using water-coal slurry fuel (consisting of 
fine coal particles suspended in water), with 
combustion characteristics similar to those of 
fuel oil and “synthesis gas” - a fuel mixture con-
sisting mainly of methane and carbon dioxide 
(produced through the gasification of coal or 
lignite). Official estimates suggest that the proj-
ects financed under the agreement would allow 
Ukraine to replace up to 4 billion m3 of import-
ed gas (which until now has been in use as fuel 
in thermal power plants) with locally extract-
ed coal. As a result, the Ukrainian government 
would be able to guarantee sales of up to 10 
million tonnes of local coal annually and could 
produce savings of $1.5 billion due to a reduc-
Some of Ukraine’s recent gas initiatives 
give the impression that they have been 
designed to benefit mainly individuals with 
close links to the current president.
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tion in gas imports15. Ukrainian experts, how-
ever, have raised doubts about the forecasted 
economic effects of this scheme and about the 
real intentions of the government in Kyiv. So 
far there are no reliable estimates of the actual 
cost of producing such fuel from coal. (Unlike in 
China, where cheaper opencast lignite mining 
is used in the production process, in Ukraine 
the production would need to be based on 
deep-lying coal deposits). The financial plans 
submitted by Naftogaz show that only one of 
the projects scheduled for implementation in 
2013 involves a switch from gas to coal, while 
the other three focus on the construction of 
coal gasification plants near the consumers 
of their future energy output. In official doc-
uments, Naftogaz defines these consumers as 
“chemical and fertiliser plants”. The decision 
to locate the proposed energy plants close to 
chemical plants controlled by Dmytro Firtash 
suggests that the project may mainly be of ben-
efit to him or to an interest group associated 
with the Ukrainian president’s son, Oleksandr 
Yanukovych, which controls some of Ukraine’s 
coal industry, and which is locally known as ‘the 
family’16. To date, however, no significant prog-
ress has been made in the implementation of 
the conversion programme. On 10 June 2013, 
acting on the president’s instructions, Ukraine’s 
Energy Ministry established an interdepartmen-
tal working group led by Deputy Minister for 
the Energy and Coal Industry Ihor Popovych. 
The group has been tasked with the coordina-
tion of the programme, including the negotia-
tion of contracts for the implementation of the 
individual projects.
Kyiv’s diversification offensive
Ukraine’s plans for the diversification of its gas 
supply routes were first put forward in 2010. 
15 http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_
id=245910468&cat_id=244276429
16 http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2013/06/3/ 
377845/
Under the so-called National Projects initiative, 
the government proposed the construction 
of an LNG terminal with an initial capacity of 
5 billion m3. From the start, though, the project 
has been seen as little more than a bargaining 
chip in Kyiv’s gas negotiations with Moscow. It 
has met a series of setbacks, which have caused 
delays and raised questions about the feasibil-
ity of completing the project in line with the 
original proposals. The problems include: lim-
ited interest from potential investors (the state 
was initially expected to be only a minority 
shareholder), the low credibility the project it-
self has (marred by a scandal during the signing 
ceremony for an agreement on the creation of 
a consortium of investors17), a lack of clear in-
formation about gas suppliers (official reports 
suggest Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar, Turk-
menistan and Azerbaijan). There have also been 
changes to the actual design of the terminal. 
The original proposals envisaged a land-based 
structure which would be ready for use in 2014. 
Under the new plans however, phase 1 of the 
project would see the construction of a termi-
nal on a floating platform provided by Exceler-
ate Energy which would be fully operational by 
2015. This would be followed by a land-based 
terminal scheduled for completion by the end 
of phase 2 in 2018. The new design would 
also increase the annual capacity of the entire 
complex to 10 billion m3. In addition to the de-
sign changes, progress on the project has also 
been stalled by Turkey’s continued reluctance 
17 The document was initialled by a person who did not 
have power of attorney to represent the company intro-
duced by officials as Kyiv’s key partner in the project.  
Ukraine’s most spectacular and quantifi-
able diversification project involves gas 
imports from across the country’s west-
ern border, accompanied by a significant 
drop in gas imports from Russia.
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to grant Kyiv permission to ship gas through 
the Bosphorus. Consequently, the plans to con-
struct an LNG terminal in Ukraine appear to be 
the least realistic of all Kyiv’s projects aimed at 
reducing the country’s dependence on gas im-
ports from Russia.
Meanwhile, the most spectacular and quanti-
fiable diversification initiative which Kyiv has 
undertaken has been the decision to begin 
importing gas from across the country’s 
western border, and at the same time to rad-
ically reduce gas imports from Russia. In May 
of last year, Naftogaz and RWE Supply & Trad-
ing signed a one-year framework agreement 
for the import of up to 5 billion m3 of gas to 
Ukraine. On the basis of this agreement, the 
companies signed a short-term contract for the 
supply of 53 million m3 to Ukraine in Novem-
ber and December 2013 via a pipeline across 
Poland. The cooperation was extended into 
2013, with transfer volumes reaching network 
capacity in the second quarter of 2013 (over 
4 million m3 per day, potentially allowing an-
nual imports of up to 1.5 billion m3 along this 
route alone). In April, Ukraine began gas imports 
from Hungary. The volumes imported were ini-
tially low (totalling only 18.1 million m3 by the 
end of May) but they increased significantly 
in June, reaching 138 million m3. According to 
figures released by Ukraine’s gas network op-
erator UkrTransGaz, between November 2012 
and the end of June 2013, Ukraine imported 
683 million m3 18 of gas from the two countries, 
including 527 million m3 via Poland. The gas pur-
chased from RWE is up to 10% cheaper than the 
gas supplied by Gazprom under the ‘Tymoshenko 
contract’. Kyiv is pointing to this fact in order 
to emphasise the unfairness of both the pricing 
formula set by Russia and of the terms of Kyiv’s 
current contract with Gazprom.
Last year, Ukraine imported only 33 billion m3 
of Russian gas (a drop of nearly 27% against 
2011), of which Naftogaz purchased just 25 bil-
lion m3 (8 billion m3 was bought by Ostchem, 
owned by Dmytro Firtash). This, together with 
the continuation of the so-called “virtual re-
verse flow” of Russian gas from Europe back to 
Ukraine (a phrase coined in Moscow to describe 
Kyiv’s gas imports from Europe), has caused 
a strong reaction from Russia. On 23 Janu-
ary 2013 Gazprom issued Naftogaz with a bill 
for $7 billion for 16 billion m3 which Kyiv had 
arguably failed to purchase (calculated as the 
difference between the minimum quantity of 
gas set out in the ‘take of pay’ clause of the Ty-
moshenko contract and the amount of gas ac-
tually collected and paid for by Naftogaz). Kyiv 
rejected  the bill, claiming that it had informed 
Gazprom about Kyiv’s plans to reduce imports 
from Russia. However, under the terms of the 
current contract, any such change needs to be 
approved by both parties at least six months 
before the beginning of the year in which 
shipments are to be reduced. In addition, on 
29 April 2013, the government in Kyiv approved 
its forecasted gas balance for 2013, according 
to which Ukraine intends to reduce gas imports 
to 27.3 billion m3, of which only 18 billion m3 
will be purchased under the contract between 
Naftogaz and Gazprom (8 billion m3 is to be 
imported by Ostchem, and 1.3 billion m3 is to 
come from Kyiv’s contract with RWE). The gov-
ernment has also announced the possibility of 
further reductions in 2014.
18 http://www.utg.ua/uk/press/site-updates/україна-в-
червні-майже-вдвічі-збільши/
The recent developments do not necessarily 
determine the future direction of Ukraine’s 
energy policy. A potential agreement to 
revise the 2009 gas contract with Russia 
could raise questions about the viability of 
many of the diversification initiatives.
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More strategic decisions yet to come
Despite Ukraine’s initiatives aimed at diversify-
ing its gas supply routes, Kyiv is continuing its 
efforts to negotiate a new gas contract with 
Moscow. In February of this year, President Ya-
nukovych said that Kyiv might allow Russia to 
jointly manage the Ukrainian gas transmission 
network in exchange for a reduction in gas pric-
es and guarantees that Ukraine would contin-
ue to be used as a transit country. On April 26, 
the government submitted a bill in parliament 
demanding legal guarantees for Russia’s access 
to Ukraine’s pipelines19. So far, however, the 
bill has not received approval in the Verkhov-
na Rada and on 28 June Gazprom’s CEO Alexei 
Miller stressed that, under the circumstances, 
any negotiations on establishing a gas consor-
tium would be pointless. Gazprom had warned 
Kyiv that it was considering the construction of 
a new gas pipeline which would bypass Ukraine 
and, according to reports in the Ukrainian 
press, Gazprom blocked Kyiv’s attempts to test 
the viability of gas imports from Slovakia20. The 
success of the tests could have paved the way 
for a real alternative to gas imports from Rus-
sia (the capacity of the pipeline linking Slovakia 
and Ukraine is several times higher than that 
linking Ukraine to Poland and Hungary). De-
19 The project allows, for example, transition system oper-
ations to be privatised
20 In an interview with the weekly Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 
(21 June 2013), representatives of the German supplier 
of gas to Ukraine, RWE, said that the transmission of 
gas through Slovakia could not begin because the 2009 
contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom provides that 
Gazprom is the de facto operator of the main section of 
the Ukrainian gas pipeline used to deliver Russian gas to 
Slovakia. This allows Gazprom to block attempts by Slo-
vakia to re-export Russian gas, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ener-
gy_market/ukraina-dlya-rwe-ne-babochka-podenka-a-
perspektivnyy-torgovyy-partner-_.html. If Gazprom is in 
fact entitled to exercise its right as the operator for the 
main section of the pipeline under the 2009 contract 
(which remains unclear), it seems unlikely that the com-
pany will allow the deal to go ahead before the current 
contract runs out at the end of 2019.
spite the disagreements, on 26 June Gazprom 
agreed to a $1 billion loan for Naftogaz in the 
form of a prepayment of transit fees (covering 
Moscow’s financial obligations towards Ukraine 
until the end of 2014). So far Gazprom has also 
decided not to take legal action against Kyiv 
over its refusal to pay the $7 billion bill for un-
claimed gas. These gestures of goodwill might 
suggest that an agreement between the two 
parties is still possible. At the same time howev-
er, despite earlier talks about a gas consortium, 
many serious differences of opinion remain, 
with neither side willing to make significant 
concessions. Particularly strong objections have 
been voiced in Ukraine in response to Mos-
cow’s demand that the prospective consortium 
be granted exclusive use of the Ukrainian gas 
transmission network, effectively forcing Kyiv 
to leave the Energy Community. On 21 March 
2013, this suggestion was repeated in front of 
the European media by Russia’s Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev21. Besides running contrary 
to Kyiv’s international obligations, such calls are 
also in conflict with the vested interests of the 
Ukrainian oligarchs (including those with links 
to Oleksandr Yanukovych), who want to be able 
to export gas from domestic deposits (includ-
ing from shale gas deposits) and who are deter-
mined to maintain their access to the Ukrainian 
transmission network. Agreeing to Moscow’s 
demands would also prevent a real diversifica-
tion of gas supply routes into Ukraine. Finally, 
the dispute also concerns the future of Ukraine’s 
gas storage. Moscow needs this to facilitate its 
gas exports to Europe. Kyiv will therefore need 
to decide whether access to Ukraine’s gas stor-
age should be granted exclusively to Russia or 
whether it can turn the facilities into an energy 
hub for Central Europe.
21 http://www.unian.net/news/560622-rossiya-uje-shan-
tajiruet-ukrainu-truboy-medvedev-ozvuchil-uslovie-aly-
ansa.html
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* * *
The gas policies recently pursued by the 
Ukrainian government are in stark contrast to 
the rather passive approach adopted by previ-
ous cabinets. The policies form a part of a co-
herent reform of the Ukrainian gas sector un-
dertaken jointly by Kyiv and the EU under the 
Energy Community Treaty. The recent develop-
ments in this area, however, do not necessarily 
determine the future direction of Kyiv’s energy 
policy and are easily reversible. The individual 
changes to the gas sector, including its partial 
liberalisation, have led mainly to Naftogaz be-
coming increasingly marginalised and to the 
rise of old players (Ostchem) and new players 
(VETEK - considered to represent the interests 
of the “family”). They have also created a le-
gal basis which will allow Russia to gain at least 
partial control of Ukraine’s transit pipelines.
Kyiv hoped that the diversification of import 
routes and a significant reduction in the vol-
ume of gas purchased from Russia would win it 
concessions from Moscow, which in turn would 
allow both sides to reach a compromise. A new 
gas agreement with Russia, however, could re-
sult in the rapid closure of the majority of the 
gas projects initiated by Yanukovych. As a con-
sequence of a series of practical problems dog-
ging the projects (such as the lack of progress 
on the LNG terminal or short-term contracts for 
the import of raw materials from Europe), the 
recent initiatives seem to be little more than 
elements of a bargaining game played by the 
Ukrainian government. In reality, what is at 
stake here is not so much a new gas deal with 
Russia, insomuch as the ability of the current 
president to secure re-election. Ukraine’s geo-
political position in the region appears to be of 
lesser importance. 
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APPENDIX
Ukraine’s gas consumption between 1991-2012 (bcm)
Source: Ministry of the Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine, IEA, Razumkov Centre. 
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Sources: Ukraine’s Energy Strategy to 2030. Ministry of the Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine (2012)
* The statistical dominance of Central Asian states in the breakdown of gas imports to Ukraine between 2006-2008 is 
a consequence of the mechanism in place in the local gas market following the first Russia-Ukrainian ‘gas war’ (2005-2006). 
At the time RosUkrEnergo (RUE) became Ukraine’s sole gas importer, offering local consumers relatively low prices. Although 
the gas was officially imported from Central Asia, in reality its exact origin remains unknown because RUE freely mixed these 
supplies with more expensive Russian gas.
Volume and origin of gas imports to Ukraine between 2006-2013 (bcm)
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